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ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS,
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Carlos F. Ramirez*
Only July 4th, 1993, Vicki Ann Pusich awoke in Anchorage,
Alaska, and began her day with a drink of whiskey.' After drink-
ing all day, she decided to drive from Anchorage to Walsilla,
Alaska.2 During this drive, Pusich weaved in and out of traffic,
tailgated other cars, and traveled at speeds of up to 90 miles an
hour.' As she approached Walsilla, Pusich failed to negotiate a
right-hand curve and crossed two lanes without veering or brak-
ing.4 She hit a car in which four people were traveling, killing the
driver, his son and a thirteen year-old friend and critically injuring
the driver's wife.5
In such DUI6 cases, a state will typically proceed against the
driver through an Administrative License Suspension (an "ALS"),
whereby the driver's license is suspended for an average of 90 days 7
and in some cases the driver is charged a $250 reinstatement fee.8
Subsequently, the state typically proceeds against the driver
through criminal prosecution, whereby the driver may either serve
jail time or be fined, or both, if convicted. 9 Many attorneys have
argued, with increasing success, that this combination of license
suspension and criminal prosecution amounts to double punish-
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University; B.S., cum laude, 1994, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice. The author thanks Professor William M. Treanor for his
guidance and helpful comments. The author also thanks his mother and father for
their support throughout the years.
1. See Pusich v. Alaska, 907 P.2d 29, 31 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. DUI stands for driving under the influence of alcohol. Some states refer to
this offense as DWI or driving while intoxicated. For purposes of this note the terms
will be used interchangeably.
7. See Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
8. Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.
June 27, 1995).
9. State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 20, 1995).
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ment and should be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause. 10
This Note argues that revocation of a driver's license under ALS
proceedings is not a bar to subsequent criminal prosecution by the
state. Part I discusses the potential double jeopardy implications
surrounding an ALS that is followed by criminal proceedings. Part
II discusses the reasoning employed by a majority of the courts that
hold that an ALS is remedial and, therefore, not punishment for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It also explains the rea-
soning employed by an increasing minority of courts to hold that
an ALS is punitive and, if imposed in addition to criminal sanc-
tions, will violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part III argues that
with regard to determining whether an ALS is punitive, the appro-
priate test should balance the effect of the statute on the driver
against the state's interest in protecting the public's safety. So long
as the degree of deprivation to the driver is not overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the public safety interest the statute may serve,
the ALS should not be deemed punitive for double jeopardy pur-
poses. Because courts pay great deference to governmental regula-
tory schemes, the analysis should be made under the presumption
that the state is acting in a non-punitive manner in the public's in-
terest. This Note concludes that the punitive effects on drunken
drivers by the imposition of a 90-day driver's license suspension
and a moderate reinstatement fee is not disproporionate to the
perceived risk drunken drivers pose to society while they await
trial, and thus the presumption that the government is acting in a
non-punishing capacity is not rebutted. Accordingly, the typical
90-day ALS is not punitive and may be accompanied by subse-
quent criminal prosecution.
I. Double Jeopardy, ALSs and Subsequent Criminal
Prosecution
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
put twice in jeopardy of life and limb . . . ."" The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause as
protecting against "multiple punishments for the same offense.'
' 2
10. Richard C. Reuben, Double Jeopardy Claims Gaining, ABA JOURNAL, June
1995, at 16.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). See, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Two other abuses against which the Double Jeop-
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This right is imputed to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 3 Although there is no doubt that two criminal prosecutions
of a drunk driver under the same statute for the same incident
would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,' n questions arise as to
whether a double jeopardy violation occurs where one of the pro-
ceedings is inherently administrative or civil.15
In United States v. Halper,16 the Supreme Court held that a civil
proceeding, when coupled with a criminal prosecution, violates the
Fifth Amendment if the civil action is not remedial, but rather acts
as punishment. 17 Courts are largely without guidance, however, in
determining whether an ALS is punitive or remedial. 18 The reme-
dial purposes attributed to an ALS range from serving "public
safety by removing drunken drivers off the highways pending judi-
cial hearing,"' 9 to protecting the individual from his or her own
ardy Clause protects are: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal
and a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. Halper, 490 U.S. at
440.
13. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
14. United States v. Dixon, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993).
15. See Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th
Dist. Aug. 21, 1995); Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
Davidson v. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223 (Fl. Ct. App. 1995); Nebraska v. Young, 530
N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Alaska v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska 1995); Ha-
waii v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928 (Haw. 1995); Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL
387619 (Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27, 1995); Connecticut v. Hickham, No. MV 94-
618025, 1995 WL 243352 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995).
16. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
17. Id. at 448-49. Halper was the first Supreme Court case that held that a civil
remedy may constitute punishment even though the civil remedy was not intended as
such. Id. at 442-43. In Halper, a medical service manager was indicted for submitting
65 false claims for reimbursement. Id. at 437. He was convicted on all 65 counts of
violating the criminal false claims statute and 16 counts of mail fraud. Id. The Gov-
ernment subsequently brought a second action against Halper under the civil False
Claims Act. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438. Under the Act's remedial clause Halper would
be subject to a penalty of more than $130,000 even though the government's loss
through the false claims was $585 plus its cost in investigating and prosecuting him.
Id. at 439. The District Court held that to impose this civil sanction would violate the
Double Jeopardy clause because the amount of the penalty was entirely unrelated to
the actual damages suffered and the expenses incurred by the Government. Id.
18. Compare id. at 449 (stating that punishment will occur when "a fixed-penalty
provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused"), with id. at 448 (stating "a civil sanc-
tion that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only
be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as
we have come to understand the term"). In a double jeopardy analysis, the first stan-
dard would uphold more civil sanctions than the second. Accordingly, whether a stat-
ute is held as punitive will depend on what courts interpret as Halper's test.
19. Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Davidson v.
MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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behavior. 20 Punitive purposes include deterring drunk driving2'
and retribution.22
In construing an ALS as either punitive or remedial, lower
courts generally rely on Halper,23 as well as Austin v. United
States24 and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch25
for guidance.
In Halper, the Court held that determining the character of a
civil penalty requires "a particularized assessment of the penalty
imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to
serve." 26 The Court stated that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the term. ' 27 Some
lower courts interpret Halper to be generally espousing a "solely
remedial" test for analyzing ALS cases;28 i.e. an ALS is punitive
unless its purpose is entirely remedial. However, use of such a test
would find most civil statutes punitive thus trumping the govern-
ment's power in this context. This is a result the Court specifically
warned against in Halper.29
The Halper Court also created a general "proportionality" test
for civil penalty cases. This test calls for invalidating statutes
"where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages he has caused. ' 30 Thus, a civil suit, brought in addition to
a criminal prosecution, will not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
if it is "rationally related to the goal of making the Government
20. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d at 224.
21. Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ct. App. 7th Dist.
June 27, 1995).
22. Id. at *5.
23. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
24. 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
25. - U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
26. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. In such an analysis labels of criminal and civil, affixed
by the government, would not be controlling. Id. at 447. Moreover, a "particularized
assessment" is not easily made because criminal penalties may serve remedial goals,
and remedial statutes may be viewed as punishment by defendants. Id. Thus, the
assessment cannot be made from "the defendant's perspective as even remedial sanc-
tions [will] carry the 'sting of punishment.' " Id. n.7.
27. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
28. Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th
Dist. June 27, 1995).
29. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451.
30. See id. at 449.
926
1996] DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
whole."'31 Some courts have held that this "proportionality" test is
the standard to apply in civil sanction cases;32 i.e. civil sanctions,
such as an ALS, are not punitive if they reasonably serve to make
the government whole.
In Austin v. United States,33 the Supreme Court applied the
"solely remedial" test to invalidate a civil asset forfeiture of a mo-
bile home and an auto body shop that was brought after the de-
fendant had already been convicted of violating state narcotic
laws.34. Although the Court analyzed the in rem forfeiture under
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause,35 lower courts
have looked to Austin for guidance in deciding whether sanctions,
which are generally believed to be civil, are remedial or punitive
for double jeopardy purposes.36
31. Id. at 451. Because the civil False Claims Act required a substantially dispro-
portionate amount from Halper in relation to the harm done to the government, the
statute constituted punishment. Id. at 452. However, because the government had
not challenged the District Court's figure as to how much Halper had harmed the
government, the case was remanded in order to give the government an opportunity
to present the court with an accounting of the actual cost arising from Halper's fraud.
Id. at 452.
32. See Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
12th Dist. Aug. 21, 1995) (stating that Supreme Court cases can be seen as merely
emphasizing that a civil sanction must be substantially disproportionate to the reme-
dial character of the statute for it to be punitive); Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d
598, 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a 90-day license revocation is not " 'over-
whelmingly disproportionate' to the public safety interest at stake").
33. 509 U.S. ', 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
34. Id. at 2803.
35. Id. at 2802. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed .... ." U.S. CoNST.
amend VIII.
36. See Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at 5; State v. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 34, 39
(Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1995); State v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL
243352, at *2 (Conn. Super Ct. Apr. 20, 1995). The statutes involved in Austin were
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)(1994). These provisions provide for the forfeiture
of vehicles and real property used to facilitate the commission of a crime. In analyz-
ing whether this in-rem forfeiture was punitive, the Court looked toward the forfei-
ture statute's legislative history. Unlike traditional forfeiture statutes, section 881
provides an innocent-owner defense. Austin, 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. This
exemption serves to focus the statute on the owner, thus making the statute punitive.
Id. at 2811-12. Congress passed these sections upon recognizing " 'that the traditional
criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish enor-
mously profitable trade in dangerous drugs.'" Id. at 2811. In addition, the Court
noted that forfeiture had been generally understood as punishment in England and in
the United States by the First Congress. Id. at 2806-07. As early as 1808, the
Supreme Court recognized forfeitures as punishment in Pesich v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 347 (1808).
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The Austin Court rejected two arguments by the government
that the forfeiture provisions were remedial.37 First, the govern-
ment argued that in rem forfeitures were remedial because they
protected society "from the threat of continued drug dealing" by
removing the instruments of the drug trade.38  The Court re-
sponded that the property in Austin was neither an instrument of
the drug trade nor illegally owned. 39  Second, the government ar-
gued that the forfeited property should compensate the govern-
ment for its law enforcement expenditures. 40 The Court rejected
this argument because the forfeiture statute did not correlate the
value of the seized property to society's damage or to the govern-
ment's actual law enforcement expenditures.4'
In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,42 the gov-
ernment sought to collect $900,000 in taxes under the Montana
Dangerous Drug Tax Act 43 after the defendant had been convicted
on drug charges and their marijuana plants were confiscated and
destroyed.44 Prior to this case, the Supreme Court had "never held
that a tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, [although it had]
37. Id. at 2811. The court stated: "even assuming that [the forfeiture statute]
serve[s] some remedial purpose the Government's argument must fail. A civil sanc-
tion that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only
be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment
.... " Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
38. Austin, 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
39. Id. Moreover, the Court had previously rejected this argument in cases re-
garding the confiscation of vehicles used to transport illegal liquor. See One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (rejecting the government's
categorization of a 1958 Plymouth Sedan as contraband).
40. Austin, 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
41. Id. at 2812. Austin stated, "the 'forfeiture of property is a penalty that has
absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforc-
ing the law.'" Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
42. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
43. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-101 - 15-25-123 (1987).
44. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. This was the third of a series of
proceedings. The first proceeding involved the criminal prosecution of the Kurths.
Id. The second proceeding was brought against the Kurths for recovery of cash and
equipment used in the marijuana operation. Id. The Kurths settled the forfeiture
action by agreeing to pay $18,016.83 in cash and forfeiting various items of equip-
ment. Id.
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court held, relying on Halper, that the
tax was a penalty because it was not designed to recover law enforcement costs. Id. at
1943. In addition, a tax resulting in eight times the product's market value evidenced
its punitive character. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct at 1943. The District Court
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's findings. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmedthe District
Court, however, it based its decision on the State's refusal to offer evidence justifying
the tax instead of holding that the tax was unconstitutional. Id.
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assumed that one might. '45 The Kurth Ranch Court held that
Halper's "proportionality" test was inapplicable in the tax con-
text.46 Instead, the Kurth Ranch Court analyzed the mechanics of
the tax to determine whether it was punitive.47 The Court noted
that although a high tax rate and deterrent legislative purpose48
might tend to characterize a drug tax as penal, these features are
not dispositive.49 Taken as a whole, however, the Court concluded
that the Montana tax "is a concoction of anomalies, too-far re-
moved in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape
characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double Jeop-
ardy analysis."5 The tax was conditioned upon the commission of
a crime,5' which made it "fundamentally different from taxes with a
pure revenue-raising purpose that are imposed despite their ad-
verse effect on the taxed activity. ' 52 Although the Court stated
45. Id at 1945-46. The Kurth Ranch Court recognized that "there comes a time in
the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character
as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment." Id at 1946 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)).
Moreover, Halper's invalidation of labels of criminal and civil as controlling elements
in double jeopardy analyses were further proof to the Kurth Ranch Court that a tax is
not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at
1946.
46. Id. at 1948. The majority agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Kurth Ranch which stated that a tax statute's purpose is quite different
from civil penalties. See id. Halper recognized the government's ability to impose a
civil penalty as a remedy for the costs it incurred because of the defendant's conduct.
Id. at 1948. The Court stated: "Even if it were proper to permit such a showing,
Montana has not claimed that its assessment in this case even remotely approximates
the cost of investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting the Kurths, or that it roughly
relates to any actual damages that they caused the State." Id. at 1948. As the Court
stated, "whereas fines, penalties, and forfeitures are readily characterized as sanc-
tions, taxes are typically... motivated by revenue-raising rather than punitive pur-
poses." Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
47. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
48. A significant part of the assessment was more than eight times the drug's mar-
ket value. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
49. Id. at 1947.
50. Id. at 1948.
51. Id. at 1948. This condition is "significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather
than the gathering of revenue." Id at 1948. The Court had relied in the past on the
absence of such a condition to render a tax non-punitive. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -,
114 S. Ct. at 1948. The Act's preamble indicates anti-crime intent by "'burdening'
violators of the law instead of 'law abiding citizens.'" Id. at 1946 n.18.
52. Id. In illustrating this point, the Court gives the example of taxes placed upon
cigarettes. Id. at 1947. Such taxes are placed to discourage smoking. Kurth Ranch, -
U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. But because the product's benefits-such as creating
employment, satisfying consumer demand and providing tax revenues-are regarded
as outweighing the harm, the government will allow for the cigarette industry to con-
tinue to produce cigarettes and people to buy them as long as they both pay taxes that
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that the Montana tax purported to be a type of property tax,53 it
was assessed on contraband goods the taxpayer neither owned nor
possessed because they were destroyed by the state.54 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that a tax on the "possession of goods that no
longer exist and that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an
unmistakable punitive character. '55
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States
v. 405,089.23 United States Currency,56 to re-address the issue of
whether civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution brought in sepa-
rate proceedings violates the double jeopardy clause. In 405,089.23
United States Currency,5 7 the Ninth Circuit held that civil forfeit-
ures were punishment and thus must be brought in the same pro-
ceeding to avoid a double jeopardy violation. 58 This case is of
particular importance to the ALS context because the Supreme
Court may finally provide new insight into how such civil sanctions
should be analyzed.
H. Punitive or Remedial? Lower Court Division in the ALS
Context
A. Administrative License Suspensions as Remedial
Courts diverge when determining whether an ALS is punitive or
remedial for double jeopardy purposes.59 In addition, those courts
reduce consumption and increase government revenue. Id However, these justifica-
tions disappear with respect to the Montana tax, "for the legitimate revenue-raising
purpose that might support such a tax could be equally well served by increasing the
fine imposed upon conviction." Id.
53. Id. at 1948. The Montana tax, however, is a "tax on the possession and storage
of dangerous drugs." Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111 (1987).
54. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. Here the marijuana had been
destroyed before the tax was assessed. Id.
55. Id.
56. - U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
57. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 1219. The Ninth Circuit accepted Austin's validation of Halper's "solely
remedial" test as proof that this was the test to be applied to civil forfeiture cases. Id.
Rejecting arguments by the government that Austin applied to civil forfeitures for
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause purposes only, the Court stated "[w]e
believe that the only fair reading of the Court's decision in Austin is that it resolves
the 'punishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause." See id.
59. License revocation through an administrative license procedure will bar a sub-
sequent DUI prosecution if a defendant can show all of the following: (1) an ALS is
imposed in a separate proceeding from the criminal prosecution; (2) an ALS and
criminal sanctions are imposed for the same offense; and (3) an ALS constitutes pun-
ishment. See generally Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct.
App. 12th Dist. Aug. 21, 1995). The separate proceeding element is the easiest to
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that have held that an ALS is remedial have not reached their deci-
sion using the same rationales or tests. 60 Courts that find an ALS
to be remedial rely on one or more of three basic rationales. Some
look to the statute's purpose of protecting the public's interest in
keeping roads safe;61 others look to the proportionality of the li-
cense suspension as weighed against the public interest in keeping
roads safe;62 and others rely on the government's inherent power
to regulate certain activities, such as driving.63 The following sub-
sections discuss the various arguments courts have accepted to hold
that an ALS is remedial.
1. Purpose of the Statute
In Ohio v. Sims,64 five consolidated appellants received adminis-
trative license suspensions for either testing over the legal blood-
to-alcohol level or for refusing to take a chemical breath test.65
The appellants filed motions to dismiss the underlying DUI charges
on double jeopardy grounds.66 In denying their motions, the Sims
court began by making an assessment of the penalty imposed and
the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.67 In ana-
meet because most courts have already held that an ALS and DUI prosecutions are
separate proceedings for double jeopardy analyses. New Mexico v. Kennedy, 904
P.2d 1044, 1051 (1995); Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *3. The separate offense element
has been met by defendants in some courts, see Kennedy, 904 P.2d at 1051-52 (utiliz-
ing the Blockburger same-elements test to determine that the ALS and DWI prosecu-
tion were based on the same offense), while in other courts, defendants have not met
this requirement. See Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *3 (recognizing that under a particu-
lar section of its drunk driving statute, an ALS imposed for testing above the prohib-
ited alcohol level does not require the same proof of facts as the offense of DUI).
Thus, although courts have had few or no problems in determining whether a defend-
ant has met the first two prongs, the last prong has required that courts carefully
examine the characteristics of an ALS.
60. See infra part II.A.1-3.
61. See infra part II.A.1.
62. See infra part II.A.2.
63. See infra part II.A.3.
64. 1995 WL 493291.
.65. Id. at *1.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *3 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (holding "[t]he determination of
whether a civil sanction such as an ALS constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes requires an assessment of the purposes the sanction may fairly be said to
serve"). See also Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(providing a historical assessment of the statute's purpose).
Additionally, the court looked to Ohio's 25-year history of holding that license sus-
pensions are non-punitive. Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *5. The court cited to State v.
Hurbean, 261 N.E.2d 290, 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) which stated: "[License suspen-
sion] statutes have as their general purpose the protection of the public from drunk
drivers, and to give effect to that general purpose there is prescribed separate from,
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lyzing the statute's purpose, the Sims court contrasted the older
version of the statute, which did not suspend a license until it was
processed by the bureau of motor vehicles weeks after the arrest,
to the newer version, which provided for immediate license suspen-
sion upon arrest. 68 The court stated that this change in the law was
proof that an ALS is intended to protect the public from poten-
tially dangerous drivers, not to punish the individual. 69 That multi-
ple DUI offenders faced longer license suspensions was accepted as
further proof of the statute's remedial purpose because such de-
fendants posed a greater risk to society. 0
Similarly, the court in Davidson v. MacKinnon,71 held that public
safety justifies revocation of a driver's license upon the commission
of certain offenses without implicating the Double Jeopardy
Clause.72 License suspensions protect the public from those who
independent of, and cumulative to criminal prosecution a clear remedy of suspending
the licenses of those drivers who refuse to take a sobriety test." See also Davidson v.
MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d 223, 223-24 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (looking toward Florida's 38-
year history of holding that license suspensions for conviction of drunk driving do not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
68. Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *6.
69. Id. (discussing the "non-punitive, public safety focus" of the statute). See also
infra part II.A.2. Conversely, in Hanson, 532 N.W.2d at 602, the defendant argued
that a seven-day temporary license was proof that the statute was not remedial be-
cause potentially dangerous drivers were still allowed to drive for that period of time.
The court rejected this argument stating that the temporary license was provided to
relieve due process concerns and did not defeat the remedial purpose of the statute.
Id.
70. Sims, 1995 WL 493291, at *6. But see Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232,
1995 WL 387619, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27, 1995) (viewing harsher sanc-
tions for each successive violation as retributive).
71. 656 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In this case, a motorist's driver's
license was suspended for not taking a breathalyzer test. He filed a petition for writ
of prohibition seeking to prevent subsequent criminal prosecution under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, but the court denied the petition.
72. Id. at 223-24 (examining Florida state precedents dating back to 1957 which
recognized that an ALS was passed to protect the public from potentially dangerous
drunk drivers). See also Sims, WL 493291 at *5 (looking toward its own state's prece-
dents that have held that an ALS was not punitive, but rather expressly for public
safety), Hanson, 532 N.W.2d at 601 (stating that "[d]river's license revocations...
have historically been understood as remedial, imposed for the protection of the pub-
lic"); New Mexico v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044, 1060 (N.M. 1995) (noting that the legis-
lative goal in their license suspension statute is "to provide the public with safe
roadways"); Hawaii v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (noting that "the [license
suspension] procedure protects the public interest by removing potentially threaten-
ing drivers from our state's roadways...").
The MacKinnon court did not apply the Halper analysis to its ALS; however, it did
cite to another Florida case which had analyzed an ALS under Halper. That case,
Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992), held that although suspension
of a driver's license is not remedial in the Halper sense, neither is the purpose puni-
932
1996] DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
cannot, or who choose not to control their drinking habits.73 The
purpose of the statute is to provide the public with protection
against drunken drivers through administrative means, instead of
criminal sanctions.74 Although the loss of driving privileges may be
painful to the defendants, the primary purpose of an ALS is to en-
hance safe driving.75 Its effect is remedial because it protects the
public at large and because it protects the intoxicated driver.76 An
ALS "is no more punitive than denying a person who is legally
blind a driver's license. Both [the blind individual and the drunk
driver] will live longer and healthier lives if they do not drive. 77
2. Proportionality
In Minnesota v. Hanson,78 the court utilized Halper's "propor-
tionality" test to hold that an ALS was remedial. 79 In Hanson, mo-
torists had their driver's licenses suspended for 90 days because
they failed urine tests.80 The court assessed that the statute's pur-
pose was to serve public safety by removing drunken drivers from
the highways pending a judicial hearing.8' Because this was a com-
pelling purpose, the court held that a 90-day driver's license sus-
pension was not "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to this interest
and thus is remedial.8 2
tive. Id. at 1261. See also Hawaii v. Higa, 897 P.2d at 934 (agreeing with Freeman's
reasoning); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 1992)(holding the license suspen-
sion scheme as remedial for double jeopardy purposes in that "[it] serves the rational,
remedial purpose of protecting public safety by quickly removing potentially danger-
ous drivers from the roads"); State v. O'Brien, 609 A.2d 981, 982 (Vt. 1992) (agreeing
with the holding in Strong); Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609
So. 2d 790, 795 (La. 1992) (stating that license suspensions are remedial and thus do
not violate the constitutional proscriptions against multiple punishments).
73. MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d at 224. See also Baldwin v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 430 (Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting the idea that punishment
must be determined from the offender's perspective and holding that the purpose of
their license suspension statute is to protect the public).
74. See MacKinnon, 656 So. 2d at 224.
75. Id. at 223.
76. Id. at 225.
77. Id.
78. 532 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
79. Id at 602.
80. Id. at 599.
81. Id at 601.
82. Id. at 602.
Defendants argued that a 90-day license suspension was not remedial because driv-
ers were issued temporary seven-day driver's licenses and thus could still drive. Han-
son, 532 N.W.2d at 602. The court rejected this argument by stating, "this hardship
relief is provided to alleviate due process concerns. It does not defeat the remedial
purpose of the statute." Id. Alternatively, defendants argued that this statute was not
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In Sims, appellants urged the court to apply Halper's "solely re-
medial" test to an ALS.83 The court rejected the solely remedial
test by stating: "The Supreme Court cases can be seen as merely
emphasizing the rule that, in order for a civil sanction to be consid-
ered punishment for double jeopardy purposes, it must be exces-
sive, extreme, and substantially disproportionate to the remedial
character of the statute. ' 84 In applying Halper's proportionality
test, Sims looked to: (i) 25 years of precedents establishing that an
ALS was for the protection of the public, (ii) the fact that ALS
provisions seek to remove potentially dangerous drunk drivers
from the streets immediately in order to prevent any accidents and
(iii) the fact that progressively longer suspensions were available
for multiple offenders who are presumed to create a greater risk to
society.85 These factors were evidence to the court of the statute's
non-punitive nature.86 Accordingly, the court held that the license
suspensions were riot so disproportionate to the potential harm
sufficiently remedial in that it did not disable the driver long enough to cure his or her
drinking problem. Id. The court disagreed "that only such a statute would be reme-
dial. Although the legislature could enact more stringent measures, the 90-day [sus-
pension] period is" not overwhelmingly disproportionate to the public safety interest
at stake. Id.
83. Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th
Dist. Aug. 21, 1995). Appellants cited Austin, 509 U.S. =, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993),
Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387691 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. June
27, 1995) and Ohio v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. Ohio
1995), to support their argument that Halper's "solely remedial" test was the proper
test to be applied to ALS cases.
84. Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *4 (emphasis added). See also Hanson, 532 N.W.2d
at 601-2 (stating that the "solely remedial" test was not the explicit holding in Halper,
rather it was derived from a broader analysis of the civil-criminal distinction for pur-
poses of due process. Instead the court applied a "proportionality" test, thus holding,
"[t]he 90-day license revocation suffered by the.., defendants is certainly not 'over-
whelmingly disproportionate'" to the public safety interest); State v. Uncapher, 70
Ohio Misc. 2d 4, 18 (Bowling Green Mun. Ct. 1995) (applying the proportionality
analysis of Halper); Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (inter-
preting Halper as requiring a "proportionality" test when determining whether the
sanction is punitive for double jeopardy purposes). But see Hawaii v. Higa, 897 P.2d
928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (quoting Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711(Haw. 1995) (holding that the Halper test did not apply to an ALS because "'the
court was not analyzing the constitutionality of any monetary sanction designed to
compensate the government for losses it sustained as a result of [the defendant's]
criminal actions.' ")); Alaska v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 751 (rejecting the application of
Halper's "compensation for loss" (or "proportionality") test to an ALS because an
ALS does not compensate the government and following Kurth Ranch by examining
the historical background and understanding of license revocations to determine how
such statutes traditionally had been viewed).
85. Sims, 1995 WL 493291 at *5-6.
86. See id. at *6
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presented by drunk drivers as to constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.8 7
3. Power of Government to Regulate Driving
Another group of courts has rejected the use of Halper's "pro-
portionality test" and has looked instead toward the government's
regulatory power to hold that an ALS is not punitive. These courts
have held that a license is not "property" in the everyday sense.,,
Instead, it is a "'formal permission to do something; [an] authori-
zation by law to do some specified thing.' "89 Thus, license revoca-
tions cannot be equated with forfeiture of a person's land as in
Austin,90 or money, as in Halper9' and Kurth Ranch92 because an
ALS does not diminish a driver's wealth; rather, it is similar to a
restraining order or injunction issued to protect the public from a
dangerous driver.93 Accordingly, the court in New Mexico v. Ken-
nedy94 concluded that the government possesses the power to re-
voke the license of someone whose conduct shows he or she is unfit
to continue the activity sanctioned by the license, without implicat-
ing double jeopardy concerns in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing.95 The court in Kennedy stated:
87. Id. at *6.
88. Alaska v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). Although a license
has been held to be property for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), an argument by defendants in Zerkel that a license was
property which was forfeited and thus served as punishment under Austin was re-
jected by the court. Id. at 751-52. But see Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995
WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 1995 June 27, 1995) (stating that a driver's li-
cense is no longer merely a privilege given by the state subject to revocation at any
time but has taken on new meaning and has become "a substantial right which may
not be deprived without due process").
89. Zerkel, 900 P.2d at 752 (quoting WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 779
(3rd. College ed. 1988)).
90. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
93. Zerkel, 900 P.2d at 752.
94. 904 P.2d 1044 (N.M. 1995).
95. Id. at 1056. See also Nebraska v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Durfee v. Ress, 81 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Neb. 1957)) (" 'A license to oper-
ate a motor vehicle in this state is issued, not as a contract, but as a privilege, with the
understanding that such license may be revoked for cause by the state.' ").
In regulated areas other than driving, courts have traditionally held that administra-
tive suspension of a license is distinct from criminal prosecution, and thus, suspension
of a license is not considered punishment. Two cases in particular, U.S. v. Bizzell, 921
F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1990) and Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705
(Haw. 1995) give guidance as to when a non-monetary civil sanction that seeks to
revoke a privilege is remedial.
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When an individual fails to adhere to the standards set by the
government for participation in a regulated activity or occupa-
tion, the government generally may bar the individual from par-
ticipation in that activity or occupation without implicating
double jeopardy, so long as the sanction reasonably serves regu-
latory goals adopted in the public interest.96
Thus the government reserves the power to revoke a license if the
licensee fails to act in accordance with set regulations.97 In an
ALS, the government merely exercises the power to revoke the
driving privileges it has afforded.
In Bizzell, Defendants had administrative complaints filed against them by the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") for violation of certain
HUD regulations in the sale of five properties whose mortgages HUD insured. 921
F.2d at 264. They were barred from participating in HUD programs for approximately
two years. Id. They were subsequently indicted and charged with conspiracy to de-
fraud the U.S. and HUD, and making false statements to HUD to obtain loans. Id.
Defendants then moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. In
analyzing the debarment, the court guided by Halper's "proportionality" test held
that debarment was not disproportionate because its "clear intent ... [was] to purge
government programs of corrupt influences and to prevent improper dissipation of
public funds. Removal of persons whose participation in those programs is detrimen-
tal to public purposes is remedial by definition." Id. at 267.
In Loui, 889 P.2d at 707, the defendant was convicted of the attempted first degree.
sexual abuse and kidnapping of his medical assistant. His physician's license was sub-
sequently suspended for a period of one year. Id. at 708. Defendant appealed the
revocation of his license by alleging that it was a second punishment for the same
offense and was therefore precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 709. The
Hawaii Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that Halper's holding is restricted
to the extraction of monetary damages from defendants, but that the broader princi-
ples enunciated by Halper would be helpful in this case. Id. at 711. In evaluating the
purpose actually served by the sanction in question as required by Halper, the court
concluded that the license revocation statute was not designed to punish the defend-
ant; rather, it was designed to protect the public from unfit physicians. Id. The court
held that this was a legitimate non-punitive governmental objective. Loui, 889 P.2d at
711. The Loui court also recognized the strong policy considerations for limiting
Halper: Hawaii statutes applying to disbarment of attorneys, and other professionals
such as veterinarians, certified public accountants, and psychologists would be called
into question if Halper were to be applied to them. Id. at 712. Based on the holding
of Halper which was limited to the "rare case" involving monetary sanctions, exten-
sion into the professional license arena was something the Loui court declined to do.
Id.
96. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044, 1056 (N.M. 1995) (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Alaska Court of Appeals in Alaska v. Zerkel held:
[Wihen the legislature employs a licensing scheme to regulate a profession
or an activity affecting the public health or safety, a statute that authorizes a
regulatory body to revoke these licenses is "remedial" for double jeopardy
purposes even though the law serves to deter licensees from engaging in
conduct inconsistent.., with the public welfare.
900 P.2d 744, 756 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
97. Kennedy, 904 P.2d at 1056.
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B. Administrative License Proceedings as Punitive
The tests iterated in Halper and its progeny have been employed
by a small minority of courts to hold that an ALS is punitive and
thus bars subsequent criminal prosecution. 8 One of these courts,
State v. Ackrouche,99 read Austin and Kurth Ranch as establishing a
balancing test whereby "a civil sanction which is imposed for some
remedial purpose is nevertheless punishment when the punitive ef-
fects are sufficiently great to outweigh the remedial purposes." 100
Other courts apply Halper's "solely remedial" test,' or a "totality
of circumstances" test to hold that an ALS is punitive.102 In apply-
ing the various tests, these courts have focused on the legislative
98. See supra part II.A.
99. 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 34 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1995).
100. Id. at 39. The court in Ackrouche was faced with a motion to dismiss further
prosecution by the defendant who argued that he had already been punished for
drunk driving by having his license revoked. Id. at 36. Halper's decision, the court
pointed out, was expressly limited to the "rare case" where a civil penalty bore " 'no
rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its loss.' " Id. at 39
(quoting Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449). Although this limitation had been used by other
courts to reject the argument that an ALS was punishment for double jeopardy pur-
poses, the Ackrouche court stated that Austin and Kurth Ranch have since interpreted
Halper much more broadly. Id. Austin, for instance, emphasized Halper's "solely
remedial" test. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 39. Furthermore, although Kurth
Ranch did not apply the Halper test, it "is consistent with the principle that a civil
sanction which is imposed for some remedial purpose... is nevertheless punishment
when the punitive effects are sufficiently great to outweigh the remedial purposes."
Id. Accordingly, the Ackrouche court held that the determination to be made is
whether an ALS can be properly characterized as more punitive than remedial, by
assessing the character of the sanction imposed by the state. Id.
101. Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.
June 27, 1995). This court states that this is the test to be applied to civil sanction
cases. Gustafson rejected appellant's interpretation of Halper by stating "that as long
as the sanction serves remedial goals it will not be punishment, is an intentional mis-
representation of the" Halper holding as affirmed by Austin: "[A] civil sanction that
cannot be fairly said to solely serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be ex-
plained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment as we
have come to understand the term." Id. at *5 (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
at 2812).
102. Connecticut v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352 (Conn. Sup. Ct.
at New London Apr. 20, 1995). Here Defendant sought to have her subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution dismissed because she had already been punished for drunken driving
by having her license suspended for 90 days. The Hickham court held that case by
case analysis was necessary and would require Halper's particularized assessment of
the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may be fairly said to serve. Id.
at *3. This is an approach this court feels is mandated by Supreme Court decisions.
Id. "Austin asks that we establish a multi-factor test for determining whether forfei-
ture is constitutionally excessive." Id. (quoting Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2812 (1993)).
938 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
purpose, the mechanics of the statute and the hardships an ALS
causes a defendant.10 3
In applying the various tests, the aforementioned courts have re-
lied on Halper's definition of what constitutes punishment -
whether the statute serves the goals of deterrence and retribu-
tion.10 4 Deterrence is "anything which impedes or has a tendency
to prevent."'10 5 Retribution is "something given or demanded in
payment or in criminal law it is based on the theory that every
crime demands payment in the form of punishment. 0 6 However,
Halper never answered the question of how much deterrence and
retribution is required for a civil sanction to rise to the level of
punishment. Justice Scalia's dissent in Kurth Ranch specifically ad-
dressed this problem:10 7
We dodged the bullet in Halper ... by leaving it to the lower
courts to determine at what particular... level [a] civil fine ex-
ceeded the government's 'legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objectives' and thus became a penalty .... In the present case,
however,.. . we grapple with the... inquiry: when is a tax so
high (or something-else) that it is a punishment? Surely further
enigmas await.108
103. See supra part II.B.1-3.
104. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). See also Kennedy v. Men-
doza 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (stating that the traditional aims of punishment are
deterrence and retribution).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 450 (6th ed. 1990).
106. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1940 (unabridged 1986), defines retribution as the dis-
pensing or receiving of reward or punishment.
The term retributive will be used by courts throughout this part when analyzing
what characteristics constitutes punishment. Retributive is defined by Webster's as
"of, relating to, or having the nature of retribution: involving condign punishment."
Id. at 1940. Punishment is defined by Webster's as retributive suffering pain or loss.
Id. at 1843. Accordingly, it is safe to assume that whenever the court uses the term
"retributive characteristics" it is referring to "punitive characteristics," and vice versa.
107. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994).
108. Id. However, in expressing the difficulty in making such an inquiry, Justice
Scalia does not provide lower courts with any guidance.
Professor Mary M. Cheh also noted that the most significant limit on Halper is that
we may not always know whether a given civil proceeding actually operates
"to punish." For monetary penalties, Halper gives us a useful albeit broad.
formula. For adverse actions that are not measured in currency, however,
the matter is less clear. Here we need guidance as to what punishment is for
double jeopardy purposes.
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1378 (1991).
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Accordingly, because of lack of guidance, assertions by courts that
an ALS serves to punish rather than to protect the public from the
risk that a drunk driver poses are often conclusory. For instance,
Ackrouche held that an ALS "is specifically designed to punish the
individual's conduct.., rather than serving a general remedial pur-
pose." 1°9 However, in concluding so, the court did not address
what "general remedial purposes" an ALS may serve,110 nor did it
explain why a combination of the factors it looked to deemed an
ALS punishment."'
Finally, these courts' analyses have relied too heavily on an
ALS's deterrent characteristic when determining whether they are
punishment. For example, Gustafson held that "the existence of a
deterrent purpose in [an ALS] alone.., mandates a finding that
the sanction imposed on appellee was a punishment for purposes
of double jeopardy.""' 2 However, Halper specifically required that
punishment serve two goals-deterrence and retribution-not just
one of the two. 113 In addition, the Court in Kurth Ranch, stated
that an obvious deterrent alone does not mark a statute as a form
of punishment." 4 Accordingly, for an ALS to be punitive it must
fulfill both deterrent and retribution requirements.
1. Legislative Purpose and History
Courts have held that their state's legislatures clearly intended
for an ALS to deter drunk driving and that the motivation to deter
is indicative of punishment. 1 5 For example, in Connecticut v.
Hickham,1 6 the court looked to the statements of elected repre-
sentatives, who often stress the deterrent effect of license suspen-
sions and how it is one of the most severe penalties available for
109. 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 34, 40 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1995).
110. But see Connecticut v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1995) (conceding that an ALS does have the intent of
making roads safe, but concluding, nonetheless, that an ALS is punitive for double
jeopardy purposes).
111. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
112. No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27,
1995).
113. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
114. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994).
115. Gustafson, 1995 WL 387619 at *5. In this case, the defendant was stopped for
speeding and subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at *1. After
suspension of his driver's license, the defendant moved to dismiss the subsequent
DUI prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. Id. The trial court granted the motion
and the State of Ohio appealed. Id. See also Hickham, 1995 WL 243352.
116. 1995 WL 243352.
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DUI offenders. 1 7 Additionally, the court examined statements by
a transportation safety expert before the Connecticut House Judi-
ciary Committee, which were influential in causing the state to pass
an ALS statute." 8 The expert articulated three reasons why an
ALS serves as an effective deterrent: "(1) it is viewed by drivers as
a severe sanction; (2) it can be invoked with certainty; and (3) it
goes into effect shortly after arrest."" 9 The expert asserted that an
ALS serves as a less costly sanction than jail sentences. 20 Thus the
Hickham court accepted the statements of its elected government
officials and safety experts as proof that the legislative intent was
to use an ALS for punitive purposes. 12
The court in Ohio v. Gustafson122 held that an ALS serves a de-
terrent purpose by threatening motorists with the sanction of hav-
ing their license suspended. 23 This purpose, the court stated, was
underscored by extensive public relations campaigns warning mo-
torists of the punishment they may face if they drive while under
the influence of alcohol.124 Accordingly, the court held that, "[t]he
existence of a deterrent purpose in [an ALS] alone or in conjunc-
tion with the finding of a retributive intent associated with the
sanctions contained therein, 25 mandates finding that the sanction
117. Id. at *5. The Hickham court viewed the following statements of its elected
officials as proof of an ALS's punitive intent:
Before the Judiciary Committee [c]onsidering House Bill H.B. 5097 March
20, 1989.... Rep. Wollenberg[:] ... I agree that one of the strongest deter-
rents we have is to take someone's license . . . [;] Sen. Avallone[:] . . . I
understand that a quick suspension of the license was, under the studies an
important factor in deterring crime[;] ... Rep. Lawlor[:] . . . Would it sur-
prise you if I said that a 90 day suspension of someone's driver's license is
probably among the most, in terms of numbers, among the most severe pen-
alties that are dolled (sic) out in our court system today?[;] Statement of
Laughlin M. McClean Chairman of Governor's Task Force on Driving While
Intoxicated in Support of Bill No. 5097-Per Se License Suspension....
Loss of license is swift and sure, adding greatly to the deterrent effect [of an
ALS] ... ; House of Representatives, May 30, 1989... [.] Rep. Tulisano[:]
... [license suspensions] penalize[] people stronger than any thing we have
seen here if punishment is the answer. Id.
118. Id. at *5. (statements by Steven Blackstone of the National Safety Board).
119. Hickham, 1995 WL 243352 at *5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27, 1995).
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id.
125. These sanctions were noted by the court as the $250 reinstatement fee and a
prohibition against work privileges for fifteen days.
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imposed on appellee was a punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.' '1 26
Lacking a formal legislative history, the court in Ohio v.
Ackrouche inferred the intent of the legislature from the provisions
of Ohio's ALS statute itself.127 The Ackrouche court noted that in
1993 the state amended its driving offenses code as part of a com-
prehensive legislative enactment designed to deal with drunk driv-
ing.128 New provisions authorized pretrial sanctions for certain
crimes. 129 One provision authorized the seizure of automobiles
used in the commission of certain offenses; another provision au-
thorized immediate driver's license revocation for refusing to take
a chemical test or for testing over the legal blood-alcohol level;
other provisions prohibited "any court from staying an imposed
[driver's license] suspension pending its appeal, and [limited] the
court's power to grant occupational driving privileges for a mini-
mum specified period.' 130  "Considered in their entirety," the
Ackrouche court held, "the 1993 revisions to the drunk driving law
were clearly intended to 'get tough' on drunk drivers by imposing
new sanctions which are 'swift and sure.' ,131
2. Deterrent and Retributive Mechanics of an ALS
In analyzing whether an ALS is punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, some courts focus on the actual mechanics of the stat-
ute.132 The court in Ackrouche noted that the Ohio statute's retrib-
utive purpose is evident because "the length of the suspension
[increases] according to prior offenses 33 and the availability of oc-
126. Hickham, 1995 WL 387619 at *5.
127. Ohio v. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 34, 39 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1995).
But see Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th
Dist. Aug. 21, 1995) (looking to 25 years of Ohio precedents holding that an ALS was
not punitive for double jeopardy purposes).
128. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 39-40.
129. Id. at 40.
130. Id. Unfortunately, the court does not specify how the second of these two
characteristics is punitive. However, we may reasonably infer that the court interprets
these as punitive because they limit a judge's ability to make ALS sanctions less
severe.
131. Id.
132. Factors taken into consideration include whether the statute focuses on the
culpability of the driver, whether the amount of time varies according to prior of-
fenses, whether other fines are tagged on to the suspension and whether drivers serv-
ing suspensions under criminal prosecution are credited for suspensions served under
an ALS. Id.
133. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 40. See also Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A.
232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27, 1995) (noting harsher
restrictions imposed for each successive violation as punitive).
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cupational driving privileges also depends on the number of prior
offenses.' 1 34 Moreover, ALS statutes that provide credit against
any judicial suspension of a person's driver's license provide evi-
dence of its punitive intent. 35 From these crediting provisions, the
Ackrouche court inferred the legislature's recognition "that a
driver whose license has been suspended ... has already been pun-
ished by the time any judicial suspension is imposed upon convic-
tion for a violation.' '1 36
Yet another factor that served as evidence to the court in Gustaf-
son that an ALS was punishment was that it punished individual
conduct by focusing on the culpability of a specific driver, rather
than serving the general remedial goals of protecting public
safety. 37 The Court in Austin also found that focusing on the cul-
pability of a defendant was indicative of a statute's punitive
intent.' 38
Additionally, $250 reinstatement fees tagged onto the suspen-
sion have served, in the view of some courts, as further evidence of
the statute's retributive intent. For example, the Gustafson cotirt
held that the additional $250 license reinstatement fee, for a person
"working on a minimum wage schedule... may... constitute cruel
and unusual punishment for what should be considered a traffic
offense. '139
3. Hardship Suffered by Defendant
Lastly, although courts hold that whether a civil statute is puni-
tive should not be determined from the defendant's perspective,
who is likely to feel the "sting of punishment" from any civil sanc-
134. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 40. The court does not specifically give rea-
sons why these characteristics are indicative of a statute's punitive nature. The court
may be assuming this because punishing predicate defendants more severely is a trait
of criminal statutes. However, the court in Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995
WL 493291, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. Aug. 21, 1995), noted that people who
drink and drive more often are less safe and thus keeping them off the roads for
longer periods of time would seem to serve the public interest and thus not be
punitive.
135. Id. See also Gustafson, 1995 WL 387619 at *5 (stating "the intent to punish
under [the ALS statute] is clear by virtue of the fact that credit is given for the license
suspension").
136. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 40.
137. Gustafson, 1995 WL 387619 at *5. See also Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d at 40
(noting that the Ohio ALS statute was designed to punish the individual by focusing
on his or her culpability).
138. See Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810-11 (1993).
139. 1995 WL 387619 at *5.
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tion,140 some courts nevertheless point out that defendants appear
more distressed by an ALS than by jail time. The court in
Hickham noted that defendants often offer more resistance to the
license suspensions than they do to short jail sentences or major
fines. 14 1 In addition, the livelihood of the defendant and his or her
family may be dependent on the ability to operate a motor vehi-
cle.142 Accordingly, the Hickham court held that suspension of a
driver's license is a great hardship to any person and thus acts as
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 143
HI. A Proportionality Approach to ALS Cases
Courts that have addressed the double jeopardy concerns posed
by an ALS have all looked to Halper and its progeny for gui-
dance. 144 However, disagreement has arisen because Halper es-
pouses contradictory standards to apply when deciding the nature
of civil sanctions. 45 For example, Halper stated that "a civil sanc-
tion that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment.' 1 46 This standard would neces-
sarily render a statute, with the slightest punitive aspect, punish-
ment; thus, trumping any legitimate civil sanctioning power the
government may have. Halper also created a "proportionality"
test whereby a statute will be rendered punishment if what it seeks
to exact is overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages the de-
fendant has caused. 47 This standard would allow a civil sanction to
comprise a higher level of retribution and deterrence than the
"solely remedial" standard, without it being deemed punishment.
In addition, Halper and its progeny do not provide factually com-
patible precedents for drunk driving cases.' 48 Therefore, courts
140. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989) (requiring that a
sanction's punitive nature must not be examined from a defendant's perspective); Ha-
waii v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (recognizing Halper's requirement that
the a statute is not analyzed from the defendant's perspective).
141. 1995 WL 243352 at *5.
142. Id. at *6.
143. Id.
144. See supra part II.A-B.
145. See supra part II.A-B.
146. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 449.
148. In most cases courts simply applied one of the tests espoused by Halper. See
supra notes 64-70, 78-87 and accompanying text. However, other courts rejected the
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" test because the damage caused by drunken di-
vers was not monetarily quantified, and instead looked toward the principles underly-
ing the Halper decision and factually similar cases which have recognized the
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should disregard the specific tests espoused by Halper because they
are contradictory and do not work well in the non-monetary civil
sanction context. Instead, courts should rely on the general princi-
ples espoused in Halper.
From Halper we can extract the principle that the government
can cause some harm to an individual so long as it is not dispropor-
tionate to the interest the government has in being compensated
for any damage committed by the defendant. In the ALS context,
courts should weigh the harm caused to a defendant by an ALS
statute against the risk a drunken driver poses to society. So long
as the harm to the individual of having his license revoked for a
period of time is not overwhelmingly disproportionate to the risk
he or she poses to society, the statute should be deemed non-puni-
tive. However, if the harm to the individual is overwhelmingly dis-
proportionate to the risk he or she poses to society, the statute will
be deemed punishment for double jeopardy purposes. This entire
analysis should be made in light of the deference given to the gov-
ernment in the administrative license context. 149
A. Factual Incompatibility: The Non-Monetary Nature of ALS
Cases
There is factual incompatibility between Halper and its progeny
and ALS cases.' 50 Halper dealt with a civil fine for fraudulent bill-
ing practices, 151 Austin considered the forfeiture of personal prop-
erty for violating drug laws, 15 and Kurth Ranch involved a tax on
illegal drug profits.153 In those cases, the defendant's illegal con-
government's power to revoke a privilege and subsequently prosecute without violat-
ing the Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
149. Using cases in other administrative license contexts is appropriate because the
objectives throughout these regulated areas are the same as in the driving arena: to
regulate activities which would pose a danger to society if not carried out properly.
See In re Nelson, 450 P.2d 188, 193 (N.M. 1969) (holding that action taken against an
attorney was for "the protection of the public.. ."); United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d
536, 541 (10th Cir. 1994) (disbarring banking officials was "a means of protecting the
integrity of the banking system and the interest of the depositors"); Loui v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711 (Haw. 1995) (holding that medical license sus-
pensions were "designed to protect the public from unfit physicians").
150. See Alaska v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
Halper's "compensation for loss" test does not apply to the ALS context); Hawaii v.
Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (holding that the Halper test does not apply to
non-monetary civil sanctions).
151. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
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duct was monetarily quantifiable. 54 Thus, the Supreme Court
could easily determine, by comparing the cost of the illegal conduct
to the cost of the fine exacted, whether the government was trying
to remedy its loss or punish the wrongdoer.' 55 As stated by Profes-
sor Cheh, "for monetary penalties, Halper gives us a useful albeit
broad formula. For adverse actions that are not measured in cur-
rency, however, the matter is less clear. Here we need guidance as
to what punishment is for double jeopardy purposes. "156
Certain courts have rejected the "overwhelmingly disproportion-
ate" or "compensation for loss" test with regard to ALS cases be-
cause Halper's tests were designed to decide when a monetary civil
sanction does not serve the goal of compensating the govern-
ment. 57 These courts reason that the Halper test was not intended
to judge the punitive aspect of a civil sanction that revokes a
privilege. 58
Agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, the majority in
Kurth Ranch also rejected use of Halper's "proportionality" test. 59
"Tax statutes need not be based on any ... damage or cost in-
curred by the Government as a result of the taxpayer's activity" as
was the case in Halper.160 Moreover, the Court stated that even if
it were proper to apply Halper's test to the tax statute, "Montana
has not claimed that its assessment... roughly relates to any actual
154. Even when the fine is not monetary but involves forfeiture of property, deter-
mining a statute's remedial nature is not very difficult because a monetary value can
be put on property. As the Court stated in Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2811-12 (1993) (citations omitted), "[wie have previously upheld the forfeiture
of goods involved in customs violations as 'a reasonable form of liquidated damages.'
But the dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property [here] un-
dercut any similar argument with respect to [the present] provisions."
155. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
156. Cheh, supra note 108, at 1378.
157. New Mexico v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044, 1055 (N.M. 1995); Alaska v. Zerkel,
900 P.2d 744, 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting Halper's "compensation for loss"
("proportionality") test); Hawaii v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995) (noting that
Halper's "proportionality" test did not apply to the ALS context). In ALS cases, the
harm committed against the government by a person driving under the influence of
alcohol cannot be monetarily quantified for purposes of Halper.
158. Kennedy, 904 P.2d at 1055. In the ALS context, the government is not seeking
to be remedied in any way. This was noted by Freeman v. State, 611 So. 2d 1260, 1261
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), which stated that an ALS was not remedial in the Halper
sense, nor was the statute punitive. The California Court of Appeals also noted this
in Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App. 1991): an ALS "achieves no compensa-
tion for any injured party for tangible loss," nor is the statute punitive, instead the
statute's purpose is to facilitate the collection of evidence and to protect the public
from unfit drivers. Id. at 94.
159. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1995).
160. Id at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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damages that [the defendants] caused the state. And in any event,
the formula by which Montana computed the tax assessment would
have been the same regardless of the amount of the State's dam-
ages and, indeed, regardless of whether it suffered any harm at
all."' 161 Thus, the Court examined the tax statute's nature by ana-
lyzing its specific mechanics and characteristics. 62
Nevertheless, a proportionality, or balancing test akin to the one
described in Halper should be employed in non-monetary civil
sanction cases, such as those concerning an ALS; however, rather
than determining whether the sanction is overwhelmingly dispro-
portionate to the money owed to the government, the non-mone-
tary civil sanction test should determine whether the deprivation
the civil sanction causes the driver is overwhelmingly dispropor-
tionate to the perceived risk of harm the driver poses to society.
B. Halper's Contradictory Nature
Halper's holding has been widely misconstrued by lower courts.
Courts that interpret Halper as espousing a "solely remedial" test
have not identified the test actually espoused in that case.163 The
Court in Halper specifically stated:
What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such
as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a
prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages he has caused [and] bears no
rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government
for its loss."6
Justice Kennedy in concurrence explained the Court's holding:
"The controlling circumstance is whether the civil penalty imposed
in the second proceeding bears any rational relation to the dam-
ages suffered by the Government. Here it does not, so it must be
considered punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.' 1 65 Use of a "solely remedial" test would deem almost any
remedial statute punitive and thus trump the government's power
161. Id. at 1948.
162. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
163. See Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th
Dist. June 27, 1995) (applying the "solely remedial" test). But see Minnesota v. Han-
son, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the "solely remedial
test" was not the explicit holding in Halper. Instead that language was derived from a
broader analysis of the civil-criminal distinction for purposes of due process, not for
determining whether civil sanctions are punishment.).
164. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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to collect civil penalties. The Court specifically stated in Halper
that it did not want to cause this result. 166 Moreover, both the ma-
jority and the concurrence focus on proportionality in determining
whether the statute is remedial or punitive. 167
For example, the defendant in Halper defrauded the government
of $850 and the government then sought to exact over 220 times
that amount in a civil proceeding. 168 The government could no
longer be remedying any loss it had sustained; instead, it was pun-
ishing the defendant.1 69 Thus, only in a situation where the govern-
ment grossly misuses its power will the Court deem the
government to have punished the individual for double jeopardy
purposes. 170 The Halper Court conceded "that this inquiry will not
be an exact pursuit;'' nonetheless, for an ALS sanction to be
punishment it must be overwhelmingly disproportionate, excessive
or extreme. 72
C. Halper's Proportionalty Principle in the ALS Context
Although Halper and its progeny are factually incompatible in
analyzing the nature of non-monetary civil sanctions, nevertheless,
a proportionality, or balancing test akin to the one described in
Halper should be employed; however, rather than determining
whether the sanction is disproportionate to the money owed to the
166. Id. at 451.
167. Evidence that the Court would not apply the "solely remedial" test can be
found in its approval of fixed penalty-plus-double damages statutes as remedial. Id. at
449. Because such statutes go further than merely compensating the government, the
double damages aspect of the statute would necessarily fail under the "solely reme-
dial" test. Thus, approval of civil sanctions as remedial that would necessarily fail
under a "solely remedial" test is proof that the Court would not approve of applying
such a test to civil sanctions.
168. Id. at 439-40.
169. Id. at 452.
170. Ohio v. Sims, No. C.A. 94-12-215, 1995 WL 493291 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist.
Aug. 21, 1995), State v. Ackrouche, 70 Ohio Misc. 2d 34 (Franklin County Mun. Ct.
1995), Connecticut v. Hickham, No. MV 94-618025, 1995 WL 243352 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1995) misinterpreted what the Supreme Court was trying to accomplish in Halper
and its progeny. Halper and its progeny paid deference to the government's remedial
purpose unless the penalty sought was either "overwhelmingly disproportionate" as in
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, the forfeiture had been considered punishment historically as
in Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-07 (1993), or the tax was a "con-
coction of anomalies, too-far removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assess-
ment" as in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct.
1937, 1948 (1994). It is true that an ALS may serve a deterrent effect and it may carry
the sting of punishment, but not to the extent that they should be held punitive for
double jeopardy purposes as espoused under the aforementioned cases.
171. Halper, 432 U.S. at 449.
172. Sims. 1995 WL 493281 at *4.
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government, the non-monetary civil sanction test should determine
whether the deprivation the civil sanction causes the driver is dis-
proportionate to the perceived risk of harm he or she poses to
society.
The analysis employed in Kurth Ranch is limited to the facts of
that case and, thus, should not be applied to non-monetary civil
sanctions. The Court in Kurth Ranch did not seek to balance any
interests between the individual and society; rather, it analyzed the
tax statute's "unusual features" to determine whether it was puni-
tive. 73 Although those features were held "unusual" for a tax stat-
ute, it does not necessarily follow that they are "unusual" for other
types of civil sanctions. For example, a non-monetary civil sanc-
tion, which lacks the "unusual features" spoken of in Kurth Ranch,
may be deemed non-punitive under the Kurth Ranch test even
though it in fact acts as punishment; thus illustrating that the Kurth
Ranch test is factually incompatible with, and should not be em-
ployed to evaluate, non-monetary civil sanctions under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
When determining whether an ALS statute is punitive, a test
which balances the interests between the driver and society can be
more easily applied than one which analyzes the specific mechanics
of a statute. 74 Moreover, this balancing of interests can be reason-
ably interpreted as Halper's main principle. For example, the
Court in Halper determined that the government should be able to
deprive a defendant of something, i.e. money, without it being pun-
ishment if he commits a harm against the government; however,
for double jeopardy purposes, the Court was not willing to allow
the government to exact from the defendant an amount dispropor-
tionate to the government's interest in being compensated.
175
Thus, from Halper's outcome, we can reasonably infer that the
Court was concerned with balancing the extent to which a defend-
ant may be harmed against the interest the government may have
in carrying out its governmental powers. Consideration of the sub-
173. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying
text.
174. Since Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) and Kurth Ranch, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994), analyzed monetary civil sanctions for double jeopardy purposes, courts are
largely without guidance as to what specific mechanics and what combination of dif-
ferent mechanics deem a non-monetary civil sanction punitive, and as to when such
mechanics rise to the level of punishment. See also Cheh, supra note 108, at 1378
(asking for guidance when determining what is punishment for double jeopardy pur-
poses in the non-monetary civil sanction context).
175. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
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jective harm that a defendant experiences when deprived of his or
her driver's license is necessarily required because non-monetary
civil sanctions lack an objective manner by which to analyze them:
unlike Halper, the harm committed against the government cannot
be monetarily quantified.
Because there is a balance of interests in the ALS context fairly
similar to the balance of interest in Halper, a "proportionality" test
should be used to determine whether an ALS is punitive or reme-
dial. In an ALS, the effect of the suspension on the individual,
through deprivation of his or her driver's license, can be balanced
against the state interest in protecting society. As the driver's li-
cense suspension becomes longer, the degree of deprivation to the
driver will at some point become disproportionate to the perceived
risk he poses to society and, thus, become punishment.
D. Administrative License Suspension Cases as Evidence of the
Government's Regulatory Power
In cases dealing with administrative revocations of professional
licenses, the state's remedial objective is not quantified in terms of
money owed to the government for a specific harm, rather it re-
flects a desire to keep certain irresponsible and incompetent pro-
fessionals from harming the public. Accordingly, these cases
translate easily to the ALS context, where the remedial purpose in
suspending driver's licenses is to keep potentially dangerous driv-
ers off the streets. 176 Moreover, these cases stand for the proposi-
tion that the government can grant a privilege, revoke it for proper
reasons and then, if appropriate, bring criminal prosecution with-
out violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In other administrative licensing contexts, the government can
both prosecute and exercise a civil remedial role. For example, it is
well established that a lawyer who is disbarred for possessing nar-
cotics cannot argue that his disbarment was punishment and there-
fore he should be insulated from criminal liability for the same
offense.177 Similarly, it would be absurd for a person who murders
176. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
177. In re Calhoun, 538 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Wis. 1995) (imposing a three-year suspen-
sion of an attorney for convictions of possessing and delivering cocaine and various
misrepresentations to the court and others). See United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706
(6th Cir. 1993) (upholding conviction of postal employee for obstruction and deser-
tion of mail). In Payne, the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that his
termination was punishment thus barring subsequent prosecution. Id at 710. To al-
low this argument, the court cautioned, would work an absurd result. Id.
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someone with a registered gun to argue that he or she cannot be
prosecuted because their registered gun was taken away.
In an ALS, a person's driver's license is suspended to prevent
future irresponsible behavior. In addition, the drunk driver will be
prosecuted because there are criminal laws against driving while
intoxicated. The fact is that these situations present two distinct
objectives. One objective is to protect public safety and the other
is to punish criminal behavior. Commenting on the differences
between punishment and regulatory sanctions, Professor Cheh has
stated:
Common experience and common sense dictate that a criminal
conviction for aggravated assault should not bar a departmental
proceeding to suspend the police officer for the same conduct
.... Indeed, if we allowed the fact of a previous conviction to
bar administrative action against an individual for the same con-
duct, felons would enjoy immunity from regulation to which
others are not subject. 178
There is an argument that professional license cases should not
control in the ALS context because we may place a higher value on
driver's licenses than professional licenses.179 As the court in Ohio
v. Gustafson noted:
In this society where public transportation is either non-existent
or is, at best, inadequate and entire commercial shopping areas
are located in suburbs surrounding our cities, we can no longer
view a driver's license as merely a privilege which is given by the
State and which is subject to revocation at any time.' 80
Moreover, although a person can pursue another career after a
professional license is revoked, a driver's license revocation can
cause a person to become immobilized.18 '
Nonetheless, the argument that accords driver's licenses a higher
status in our society than professional licenses disregards the se-
vere repercussions suffered by professional license revokees. Pro-
fessionals, such as doctors and lawyers, have attended college and
graduate school, and have often spent tens of thousands of dollars
178. See Cheh, supra note 108, at 1378.
179. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
180. No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ct. App. 7th Dist. June 27, 1995).
Moreover, driving is so intrinsic to our society that some would treat it as a funda-
mental right according it the utmost protection.
181. For example, for the person living in a city with different modes of public
transportation, the harm may not be so great. But for the majority of people in this
country, who live in suburbs or rural areas, this can cause substantial or total
immobilization.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
in tuition, books, travel expenses and unearned wages.'1 2 If given
the choice, a professional would probably forego his or her driver's
license more quickly than his or her professional license because of
the difference in time and money invested in the two. In fact, revo-
cation of a driver's license which is obtained after taking a simple
test and paying a small fee, can only be described as minimal when
compared to the revocation of a professional license, which re-
quires years of schooling and large monetary expenditures. Ar-
ranging for an alternative means of transportation is generally
easier than being forced to pursue a different career. Moreover,
even though professional license revocations tend to be longer than
the average 90-day suspensions drunken drivers receive, 8 3 courts
have consistently upheld revocation of professional licenses and
subsequent criminal prosecution as not violative of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 18
E. Application of the Proportionality Test to an ALS
As part IIB discussed, some courts have held that an ALS is pun-
ishment for double jeopardy purposes. 85 However, an ALS also
serves to protect the public's interest by keeping "potentially
threatening drivers... [off a] state's roadways; and ... between the
time offending drivers are cited and their criminal adjudication, the
procedure precludes such drivers from continuing to drive."' 8 6 In
addition, courts pay deference to regulatory agencies as long as
182. See Johnathan D. Glater, Loansome Law Students: Why Payback is Tough,
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1995, (Washington Business), at 7 (stating that half of graduat-
ing lawyers carried $38,000 or more in debt in 1994. In the medical field, "[tihe aver-
age debt for a George Washington University medical school graduate in 1995 was
about $75,000.").
183. In re Calhoun, 538 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Wis. 1995) (imposing a three-year suspen-
sion of a license to practice law); Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705,
716 (Haw. 1995) (imposing a one-year license suspension of a license to practice
medicine).
184. United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1994) (barring of banking
officials indefinitely until such time as they obtained written consent from regulatory
agencies, in addition to criminal prosecution, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir. 1990) (barring of de-
fendants from HUD program for two years, in addition to criminal prosecution, was
not punitive for double jeopardy purposes). Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889
P.2d 705, 716 (Haw. 1995) (concluding that a one-year medical license suspension, in
addition to criminal prosecution, was not violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
185. See supra part II.B.
186. Hawaii v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995).
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their regulatory powers are not abused.187 Accordingly, when de-
termining whether an ALS is punitive for double jeopardy pur-
poses, courts should start with the presumption that the regulation
is a non-punitive civil sanction.
Because courts usually hold that suspensions of licenses for non-
compliance with certain regulations can accompany criminal prose-
cution,188 this Note's analysis should begin with the rebuttable pre-
sumption that an ALS is non-punitive. Accordingly, in weighing
the degree of deprivation an ALS has on a defendant against the
state's interest in protecting society, courts would probably find
that a 90-day suspension is not disproportionate to the safety inter-
est at stake. Having a driver's license suspended for a short 90-day
period cannot cause a defendant hardship to the extent that it
would render a presumptively non-punitive suspension punitive.
In fact, the hardship on the victim of a drunk driving accident is
much greater than that on a person who has had his or her license
revoked. Moreover, the government has the power to regulate
driving "in the interest of the public's safety and general wel-
fare."'18 9 From this regulatory power stems the state's power to re-
voke the individual's privilege for non-adherence to set
standards. 190
However, as suspensions become longer, it is more likely that
they will be deemed punitive.' 9' With regard to longer suspen-
sions, the degree of deprivation to a driver will at some point be-
come disproportionate to the perceived risk of harm that the driver
presents. Consider a hypothetical: Dining at a restaurant, John
Doe has three glasses of wine for dinner-enough to have him test
slightly over the legal blood-to-alcohol maximum. While driving
home, he is arrested for driving while intoxicated. He then has his
license revoked for a year through an ALS proceeding. This situa-
tion would probably be equivalent to that of Halper's. The driver
had no prior convictions of drunk driving. The reason why the stat-
ute was passed, to protect the public's interest in safe roadways, is
not reasonably reflected in a one-year license suspension in this
187. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989) (holding that a monetary
civil sanction will be punitive when it seeks to exact an amount that is "overwhelm-
ingly disproportionate" to making the government whole).
188. See supra part II.A.
189. New Mexico v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044, 1056 (N.M. 1995).
190. Alaska v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 753 (Alaska 1995).
191. See Minnesota v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (avoid-
ing the issue of whether 180-day driver's license suspensions for repeat offenders were
remedial).
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situation. This hypothetical driver has been punished and should
not face subsequent criminal prosecution. Conversely, Jane Doe
drinks considerably, and decides to go driving with a group of
friends. This is the second time she has been arrested for drunk
driving. She has her license suspended through an ALS for six
months. In this hypothetical, she probably has not been punished
since her past convictions prove that she is a dangerous driver, and
testing three times over the legal blood-to-alcohol is evidence that
she is an irresponsible person. Here, the deprivation to the driver
is not disproportionate to the perceived risk of harm she poses to
society.
Accordingly, an ALS which seeks to suspend a driver's license
should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis weighing the effect on
the driver against the state interest in protecting public safety. 192
In making this analysis, courts should afford the government the
same deference it would in any other regulatory arena. 193 In ana-
lyzing longer suspensions, courts should take into account the
number of previous convictions for drunk driving. A higher
number of convictions will heighten the government's interest in
keeping a potentially dangerous driver off the roads.
Conclusion
The power to regulate driving is inherent in the state's power to
regulate potentially dangerous activities. This power does not di-
minish in the face of criminal prosecution, but in fact, works hand-
in-hand with it. Except in rare situations where the government's
power in civil proceedings is abused, courts have consistently up-
held civil sanctions when brought against defendants in separate
proceedings. The public's interest in keeping potentially dangerous
drivers off a state's roads for 90 days is not disproportionate to any
harm it may cause the driver. Accordingly, 90-day driver's license
suspensions brought before or after criminal prosecutions do not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, an ALS that calls
for longer suspensions should be examined more closely. With
longer suspensions, the harm to the individual should be weighed
against the state's interest in maintaining safe roads. At some
point the harm to the driver becomes so great, that the presump-
192. See Cheh, supra note 108, at 1379 (stating "[als Halper itself indicated...
courts actually must determine, on a case by case basis, whether a given burden is
reasonably calculated to achieve and actually does achieve the non-punishment goals
of... regulation").
193. See supra part II.A.4.
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tion that a government agency is exercising its non-punitive powers
in the public's interest should be rebutted. Accordingly, in ex-
treme cases it should be held that the government is punishing the
individual and subsequent prosecution should be barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
